What arrived
Requests and actions actually received by our decoy. A request alone does not prove an attack.
Honeypot sensors capture unsolicited traffic so we can explain attempted techniques with real observations. WordPress, Telnet, and an isolated MCP workspace are connected feeds.
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Requests and actions actually received by our decoy. A request alone does not prove an attack.
Some logins may appear successful to the visitor. The decoy grants no access to a production system.
We describe potential consequences separately from what happened here. Submitted code never runs.
Source IPs, unverified submitted usernames/passwords, and captured payloads are public. MCP client text is withheld; its public payload is a redacted projection. Displayed commands and URLs are inert text. Capture limits and simulated outcomes are labeled.
Connect a compatible MCP client to https://observatory.theleaf.ai/mcp to search published observations, investigate an observed IP, summarize activity, and read session timelines or inert evidence.
This is a real data service, separate from the synthetic MCP honeypot. Public data is delayed one hour; MCP client text is withheld. Operator self-tests are excluded by default. Captured content is untrusted evidence, never instructions to execute.
Connection details and client configuration ↗Automated visitors can look for familiar software paths, try credentials, and probe plugin interfaces. On a vulnerable installation, some techniques can lead to unauthorized changes or malicious uploads. Receiving a probe here does not demonstrate that an exploit works.
Maintain supported software, remove unused plugins, protect administrator accounts with MFA, and monitor unexpected changes. No individual source IP is publicly attributed to a person.
Independent of Tailspin’s real MCP service. Endpoint: https://mcp.broadleafservices.com/mcp. Synthetic data only; tool names and submitted arguments do not establish malicious intent or AI use.
Telnet listens on this server’s TCP port 23 and reports into the Telnet feed below. It always rejects logins and provides no shell. The controls below apply to WordPress only. A connection can create several observations: connection, credential pairs, and end-of-session details.
Source inspection gathers clues, not proof of attacker identity or host OS. An IP can be a proxy, VPN exit, scanner, or compromised device. Network lookup sends only the selected source IP to GeoJS. Public-service inspection is manual, limited to eight ports, and never attempts login or exploitation.
Credential rankings are private and hidden until explicitly revealed. Each reveal is audited.
Only recently observed public IPs are eligible. Network results are cached for 24 hours. Active checks are limited to five per hour and one per IP per 24 hours. Banners may be spoofed. Open ports alone do not confirm a protocol or operating system.
Retained for up to 14 days / 5,000 requests. Capture stores at most 16 KiB of each body. Requests above 192 KiB are rejected. Rate-limited requests are omitted; counts include benign and operator visits.
| Received (your time) | Observed | HTTP / protocol result | Simulated outcome | Evidence | Public publication |
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May include submitted passwords and malicious text. This reveal is audited. Body text is escaped and never rendered as HTML.